Two‐year‐old children but not domestic dogs understand communicative intentions without language, gestures, or gaze by Moore, Richard et al.
Two-year-old children but not domestic dogs understand communicative intentions without language, 
gestures, or gaze 
 
Richard Moore, Bettina Mueller, Juliane Kaminski and Michael Tomasello 
 
Abstract 
Infants can see someone pointing to one of two buckets and infer that the toy they are seeking is hidden 
inside. Great apes do not succeed in this task, but, surprisingly, domestic dogs do. However, whether 
children and dogs understand these communicative acts in the same way is not yet known. To test this 
possibility, an experimenter did not point, look, or extend any part of her body towards either bucket, but 
instead lifted and shook one via a centrally pulled rope. She did this either intentionally or accidentally, and 
did or did not address her act to the subject using ostensive cues. Young 2-year-old children but not dogs 
understood the experimenter's act in intentional conditions. While ostensive pulling of the rope made no 
difference to children's success, it actually hindered dogs' performance. We conclude that while human 
children may be capable of inferring communicative intent from a wide variety actions, so long as these 
actions are performed intentionally, dogs are likely to be less flexible in this respect. Their understanding of 
communicative intention may be more dependent upon bodily markers of communicative intent, including 
gaze, orientation, extended limbs, and vocalizations. This may be because humans have come under 
selective pressure to develop skills for communicating with absent interlocutors – where bodily co-
presence is not possible. 
 
Introduction 
The ability to infer the communicative intentions of others enables individuals to engage in sophisticated 
and flexible acts of social coordination – even in the absence of language. As such, it has been hypothesized 
to explain not only human infants' acquisition of language, but also the ability of our early hominin 
ancestors to engage in the group hunting activities that allowed them to out-compete rivals in their 
ecological niche (Tomasello, 1999, 2008). These hunting abilities were boosted by the use of dogs, whose 
ability to understand human communicative intentions may be a consequence of both self-domestication 
and selective breeding (Coppinger & Coppinger, 2001; Hare, Brown, Williamson & Tomasello, 2002; Hare & 
Tomasello, 2005). In the case of pre-verbal infants, dogs and our earliest ancestors, the ability to grasp the 
communicative intentions of others must rest on the recognition of non-verbal behavioural cues and 
features of action that trigger the inferential process by which recipients try to work out their interlocutors' 
messages. However, whether or not children and dogs rely upon the same cues to interpret communicative 
intent is not known. 
 
Young children can infer an experimenter's communicative intent across a variety of non-verbal tasks 
(Tomasello, Call & Gluckman, 1997; Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2005; Senju & Csibra, 2008; Leekam, 
Solomon & Teoh, 2010; Moore, Liebal & Tomasello, 2013). However, whereas children as young as 
12 months are adept at using a point to determine the location where an experimenter had hidden a toy 
(Behne et al., 2005; Behne, Liszkowski, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2012), only older children understand the 
same message when the speaker's sign is an arrow or a replica (Tomasello et al., 1997; Leekam et al., 2010), 
and only a minority of three year olds infer that message when an experimenter indicates the location by 
intentionally pressing a light switch (Moore et al., 2013). This suggests that children may start off with a 
limited repertoire of actions that they recognize as referential – perhaps bodily actions like gesture, 
directed gaze, or speech – and only later come to grasp that any action, including prosthetic devices like 
markers and lights, could be used as signs. 
 
Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) also excel at grasping human communicative intentions – outperforming 
our nearest living relatives, the non-human great apes, in a variety of socio-cognitive tasks that involve the 
understanding of pointing (Bräuer, Kaminski, Riedel, Call & Tomasello, 2006; Kirchhofer, Zimmermann, 
Kaminski & Tomasello, 2012). Not only do dogs understand index finger pointing (Miklósi, Polgárdi, Topál & 
Csányi, 1998; Hare & Tomasello, 1999); they also understand a variety of points produced with the human 
arm (Soproni, Miklósi, Topál & Csányi, 2001) and even an extended leg (Udell, Giglio & Wynne, 2008; 
Lakatos, Soproni, Dóka & Miklósi, 2009; Kaminski, Nitzschner, Wobber, Tennie, Bräuer, Call & 
Tomasello, 2011). However, they do not use cues provided by a pointing stick or a mechanical arm 
(Soproni et al., 2001; Udell et al., 2008) – and while they can use markers to locate hidden food, they 
interpret these markers less successfully when they do not see humans placing them (Udell et al., 2008; 
Riedel, Buttelmann, Call & Tomasello, 2006; Wobber, Hare, Koler-Matznick, Wrangham & Tomasello, 2009). 
They can also accurately infer communicative intentions when a human communicator asks them to fetch 
an object by holding up and showing a replica of that object, although they are less consistent when shown 
photographs of an object with similar goals (Kaminski, Tempelmann, Call & Tomasello, 2009b). 
 
A further line of research has investigated not just the varieties of signs that children and dogs understand, 
but also the conditions under which these signs are interpreted as communicative – potentially illuminating 
the cognitive mechanisms that support the cognition of intentional communication. Children of 14 months 
use an experimenter's gaze and her extended pointing finger to find a hidden toy when these are 
performed purposively and with sustained ostensive eye contact, but not when similar points are produced 
intentionally but un-purposively and with a distracted gaze (Behne et al., 2005). (Actions performed 
purposively are necessarily intentional. However, since actions can be performed deliberately but in pursuit 
of no goal, the converse does not hold.) This finding has been replicated for dogs (Kaminski, Schulz & 
Tomasello, 2012). Furthermore, children do not take accidental actions to be communicative 
(Moore et al., 2013). While no study has explored whether dogs treat accidents as communicative, they 
have been found to follow a point more often when they had previously found food in a similar context – 
suggesting that their interpretation of referential communication is determined not only by cues provided 
by humans, but also by contextual information that leads them to expect the presence of a referent 
(Scheider, Grassmann, Kaminski & Tomasello, 2011). 
 
Several studies also testify that a human's provision of ostensive signals – in the form of directed speech 
and ostensive gaze – facilitates the comprehension of communicative intentions in infants (Senju & 
Csibra, 2008), toddlers (Leekam et al., 2010) – although see (Mooreet al., 2013) for a dissenting voice – and 
in dogs (Kaminski et al., 2012; Topál, Gergely, Erdőhegyi, Csibra & Miklósi, 2009; Téglás, Gergely, Kupán, 
Miklósi & Topál, 2012). These findings have led to the hypothesis that humans possess an adaptation for 
recognizing communicative intent, on the basis of which we are hardwired to interpret a variety of 
behavioural cues as indicating that their source has valuable information that she would like to 
communicate. This adaptation would facilitate social learning by processing automatically knowledge 
of when others are communicating, so that valuable cognitive resources can then be allocated to 
figuring what they are saying (Gergely & Csibra, 2005; Gergely, Egyed & Király, 2007; Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009; Csibra, 2010). A similar pattern of sensitivity to ostensive behaviour in dogs has led some to 
hypothesize that this adaptation is shared by dogs (Téglás et al., 2012). 
 
We sought to better understand whether there are clear limitations on children's and dogs' otherwise 
remarkable facility for understanding human communicative intent – by testing their ability to understand 
a referential act that lacked the bodily expressions of referential intent that they typically understand. We 
also sought to determine whether ostension plays the same role in human and dog understanding of 
communicative intent. If, for example, 2-year-old children turned out to be less reliant on the presence of 
ostensive cues than dogs, this might support the conclusion that subtly different cognitive processes are 
involved in the different species' understanding. 
 
In an object choice paradigm, the intentions with which an experimenter indicated the location of a hidden 
prize (a toy for children, food for dogs) varied along two lines: whether the same action was performed 
intentionally, or by accident; and whether or not the action was performed ostensively – where the 
ostensive cues that we used were ostensive eye contact and directed speech. (Note that while ostensive 
cues may facilitate comprehension, it is not necessary that a speaker produce ostensive cues in order to 
enact communicative intent – so long as she has some expectation that her communicative intention could 
nonetheless be fulfilled (Grice, 1989). The experimenter could therefore be said to have acted with 
communicative intent even in the non-ostensive, intentional condition). 
 
The prize was hidden in one of two different buckets, which could be lifted and shaken by an experimenter 
by pulling on ropes attached to the buckets via a central pulley (see Figure 1). The use of this mechanism 
allowed us to (1) indicate the hiding place using the same action across conditions, and (2) to test 
comprehension of the communicative nature of the action independently of familiarity with the sign used. 
(Were a more familiar sign – like a point – used, participants might be more likely to treat it as 
communicative even when it was not performed with communicative intent.) In addition, so as not to 
provide further information about the location of the prize, the experimenter never looked, or oriented, or 
moved her body towards the hiding location. 
 
Figure 1. The rope and bucket mechanism. Food was hidden in one of two buckets, each of which could be 
lifted and shaken by pulling on one of two centrally hanging strings. 
 
Procedure and methods 
A pair of studies was conducted, using a procedure derived from a previous study on 3-year-old children, in 
which an electronic light-and-sound mechanism was used to indicate the location of a hidden toy 
(Moore et al., 2013). Changes were made to the apparatus to make the procedure more visually salient to 
younger children and non-human participants. 
 
Participants 
Our sample consisted of 61 children of 27 ± 2 months (31 girls, 30 boys; mean age = 27; 10, range = 25;1–
29;0) who were recruited from a database of parents who had volunteered their children to take part in 
child development studies, in a predominantly Caucasian medium-sized German city. Nine further children 
were tested but excluded from the final sample because they became distressed during testing, prompting 
the experimenter to abandon the test (n = 8), or because the child was deemed to be too inattentive during 
training for this phase to have been administered properly (n = 1). 
 
In addition, 70 dogs were tested in a specially constructed dog cognition laboratory in the same medium-
sized German city. Dogs were family pets living with their owners and were recruited after their owners 
responded to adverts looking for participants in dog cognition studies. The 70 dogs included in our analysis 
all completed the experimental task and training phase. Twenty-six further dogs were excluded from the 
final sample – because they were unable to be separated from their owners for the purpose of testing 
(n = 11), because they failed to complete the training phase (n = 8), or because they failed to complete the 
full number of test trials (n = 7). 
 
Experimental set-up: children 
 
Materials and design 
For a novel sign, a rope-and-buckets mechanism consisting of two small plastic buckets hung 120 cm apart 
was used. Each bucket was lined with material (to make it silent) and covered with a fitted lid to which 
small bells were attached, to make the container both visually and aurally salient. Each bucket was tied to a 
rope and hung from a system of pulleys attached to a wooden frame (160 cm wide × 85 cm high). The tail 
end of each rope hung from the centre of the frame, behind a sheet of Perspex that was used to prevent 
child interference. The mechanism was placed upon a long, low testing table (160 × 38 × 42 cm). Various 
toys were hidden inside the buckets, including wooden cubes and plastic animals. After retrieval, children 
were encouraged to slide the toys into a ‘pling machine' (a shoe box containing xylophone keys), in order to 
produce a ‘pling' sound. In the training phase a yellow arrow (24 cm × 10 cm) and a wooden pointing stick 
(35 cm long) were also used. 
 
In a between-subjects design children each received four trials in one of four conditions in which the 
ostension and intentionality of the experimenter's action was varied: ostensive/intentional (boys n = 8; 
girls n = 8), non-ostensive/intentional (boys n = 7; girls n = 8); ostensive/accidental (boys n = 7; girls n = 7); 
and non-ostensive/accidental (boys n = 8; girls n = 8). In half the trials the toy was hidden in the left and in 
half in the right container, in counterbalanced order. Participants were tested by one of two female 
experimenters. The first tested the majority of children: ostensive/intentional (boys n = 6; girls n = 6), non-
ostensive/intentional (boys n = 5; girls n = 6); ostensive/accidental (boys n = 5; girls n = 5); and non-
ostensive/accidental (boys n = 6; girls n = 6). A second experimenter tested four further children in each 
condition (boys n = 2; girls n = 2), after the first experimenter became unavailable. 
 
Procedure 
Children were tested in a dedicated room in a child-testing laboratory. After a familiarization phase in 
which experimenter and child played with unrelated toys, the introduction phase started when the 
experimenter said, ‘I know a game we can play. Let me show you something.' She led the child to a chair 
placed centrally and 110 cm in front of the testing table and removed a sheet covering the rope-and-
buckets mechanism. Sitting behind the table, with two ropes hanging down in front of her, the 
experimenter explained to the child how the mechanism worked. She pulled on each rope in turn and said: 
‘When I pull this, this happens', while alternating her gaze between the child and the shaken bucket. The 
child was then invited to pull on the ropes herself. Finally, the experimenter demonstrated how the pling 
machine worked and encouraged the child to use it. This phase served to demonstrate the equipment to 
the child, prior to and independently from the test phase. 
 
Since a novel cue was used in the main procedure, a training phase was administered at the same table to 
introduce participants to the hiding game and to help them grasp the possibility of using different signs for 
the same goal. 
 
The experimenter called the child's attention, showed her the toy, and placed it in one of the containers in 
view of the child – before asking the child to retrieve the toy and place it into the pling machine. She did 
this once per side, in random order. In subsequent trials the experimenter concealed the toy in her hands 
and placed it discreetly into one box (random order, at most two consecutive trials per side). She then used 
one of three different signs to indicate its location (in fixed order): (1) an ipsilateral finger point, (2) an 
ipsilateral stick point, and (3) an ipsilateral arrow held vertically above the hiding place. After producing 
each sign for 3 seconds, in conjunction with ostensive eye contact and a smiling, engaged facial expression, 
the experimenter asked, ‘Do you know where [it] is?', and encouraged the child to retrieve the toy and 
place it into the pling machine. Where children made incorrect choices, they were allowed to explore the 
empty box while the experimenter retrieved the toy from its hiding place, and showed them its actual 
location. Children were not rewarded for incorrect performance. 
 
Children received each sign until they performed correctly in two consecutive trials, or until the maximum 
of six trials per sign was administered. Then the experimenter moved to the next sign, or to the main 
procedure. She signalled the end of the training phase by clapping her hands and saying ‘That was a fun 
game!' 
 
In the test phase, the experimenter hid the toy and then pulled on one rope repeatedly for 3 seconds, in 
order to lift and shake the bucket in which the toy had been hidden. This was done in one of four 
conditions. In the ostensive conditions, E engaged the child's eye contact, smiled, and said, ‘And now …' in 
an engaging way before pulling on the rope connected to the bucket in which the toy was hidden. While 
pulling the rope, E maintained eye contact and positive affect with the child. In the non-ostensive 
conditions, E did not engage the child's eye contact after hiding the toy, but studied the end of the rope in 
her hand as if inspecting it and said ‘And now …' as if speaking to herself. While pulling on the rope, E did 
not make eye contact with the child but kept looking down. In the intentional conditions, she pulled on the 
rope in a deliberate and confident manner. In the accidental conditions she shifted her weight, as if to 
make herself comfortable, and then ‘accidentally' fell over, pulling on the rope in the process. She then sat 
back, startled, threw her hands in the air in mock surprise and said ‘Oops!' 
 
In all conditions, after releasing the rope, E paused, made eye contact with the child and asked playfully ‘Do 
you know where [it] is?' 
 
Experimental set-up: dogs 
 
Materials and design 
A ground-mounted system of pulleys and ropes was built similar to the one used with children. It was 
placed on a testing mat in the centre of which an experimenter kneeled, while looking towards the subject. 
Ropes were tied to small, sealable containers positioned 80 cm either side of the experimenter. These 
ropes joined to a system of pulleys attached to the ceiling, so that each container could be lifted and 
shaken by pulling on one of the pair of ropes hanging from pulleys above the experimenter's head. A 
Perspex panel was placed in front of the ends of the hanging ropes, to discourage dogs from playing with 
them. 
 
In a between-subjects design, each dog was tested in one of five conditions by the same female 
experimenter. Four conditions matched those tested on children: ostensive/intentional (n = 14; males n = 8; 
females n = 6), non-ostensive/intentional (n = 14; males n = 7; femalesn = 7), ostensive/accidental (n = 14; 
males n = 6; females n = 8) and non-ostensive/accidental (n = 14; males n = 7; females n = 7). A further 
control condition (n = 14; males n = 7; females n = 7) was used to determine whether dogs' performance 
could be explained by a general lack of communicative competence. Here, in addition to providing the cues 
from the ostensive/intentional condition, the experimenter pointed to and gazed at the hiding-place. 
 
Procedure 
With minor differences, dogs were tested in the same procedure as children. In all conditions, and in the 
training phase, dogs were restrained 1.5 m in front of the centre of the testing table by a second 
experimenter. In a series of pre-training trials, food was hidden in full view of the dog. First E1 placed food 
in front of one bucket (random order, at most two consecutive trials per side). Once participants retrieved 
food successfully in two consecutive trials, this phase was repeated, but now food was concealed inside the 
container. After successful retrieval in two consecutive trials, participants proceeded to the training phase. 
 
A slightly adapted version of the training phase was used for dogs – with the effect that they received more 
and more suitable training than children. (The change was made because in piloting we found both that 
dogs struggled to understand training sessions in which arrows and stick points were used, and that young 
children found the marker sign difficult. Since the training was supposed to encourage participants to think 
about alternative ways of indicating the location of a prize, it was therefore tailored to their performance.) 
Instead of three varieties of sign used between two and six times teach, dogs were trained using two 
different signs: an ostensive ipsilateral point, used without gaze alternation, and a marker placed on top of 
the hiding place, with a single gaze alternation between dog and box. The training phase ended when the 
dog found the food in four consecutive trials per sign. 
 
In the training phase, the hiding process was concealed using a curtain placed between the dog and the 
experimenter, and which fully occluded the dog's view of the experimenter. The experimenter called the 
dog's name and made eye contact, while showing the dog the food that she would hide. Then E2 closed the 
curtain in front of the dog, concealing the hiding process. While the curtain remained closed, E1 opened 
each container in turn (to provide matching audio cues) and hid food in one. Once the food was hidden, E2 
opened the curtain and E1 called the dog's attention by making eye contact and saying, ‘[Dog's name], 
look!', in an engaged tone of voice, before producing the sign. 
 
In all trials in both training and test conditions the dog was able to eat any food that it found in the first box 
that it chose. When the wrong choice was made, E1 unscrewed the chosen container and allowed the dog 
to explore its contents. Subsequently, she retrieved and then stored away the food hidden in the other 
container. Participants were not rewarded for incorrect performance. 
 
Following the training phase, E1 administered the test phase in one of five conditions. In all conditions, 
when the curtain was drawn following the hiding phase, E1 uttered the words, ‘[Dog's name], look!', before 
pulling on one rope repeatedly for 3 seconds. However, her tone of voice and gaze varied across conditions, 
as did the manner in which she pulled the rope. In ostensive conditions the command was given in a 
friendly, engaged tone of voice. In addition, E1 established eye contact with participants prior to speaking, 
and maintained this while the rope was pulled. In non-ostensive conditions her tone of voice was bored and 
disengaged, and she looked down towards her knees and hands, without establishing or maintaining eye 
contact. In intentional conditions, E1 knelt on the ground and pulled on the rope in a deliberate and 
confident manner. In the accidental conditions she placed her left hand on the Perspex panel, as if shifting 
her weight, before ‘accidentally' falling forward and pulling the rope in the process. The intentional 
pointing condition was identical to the intentional/ostensive condition – except that E1 also produced an 
ipsilateral finger point and alternated her gaze between bucket and dog (see Figure 2). 
 Figure 2. An illustration of the experimental set-up. The experimenter is shown in intentional/ostensive 
(top) and accidental/ostensive (bottom) test conditions. 
 
Scoring and reliability coding 
Responses were coded from videotape and counted as correct when participants chose the bucket 
containing the prize. Following Mooreet al. (2013), children were deemed to have chosen a container if 
they opened it (and so could see the object), picked it up (and so could feel the weight of the object), or if 
they indicated that they would like the experimenter to open it – for example, by pointing. Children did not 
count as choosing a bucket just by touching it – so if they touched one bucket and then opened the other, 
the latter action was counted. These criteria were adopted to best identify cases where children had made 
a clear decision. Occasionally children approached and touched one box, before turning and opening the 
other. We interpreted this behaviour as indecision and since touching one box (unlike lifting it) gave no 
information as to its contents, did not count such cases as choices. In addition, in several cases, shy children 
did not approach the experimenter but instead pointed. We interpreted these points as requests for the 
experimenter to open the box to which the child had pointed. 
 
For children's choices to be counted as correct or incorrect, they had to be made within 30 seconds. If 
children did not make a choice promptly, they were counted as making ‘no choice'. This happened in only 
two cases. All children successfully completed the four test trials. 
 
Dogs were given 2 minutes to respond and were deemed to have chosen a location if they approached the 
box within a range of 10 cm. If dogs did not respond within 2 minutes, the trial was rerun. If dogs failed to 
choose a cup in three consecutive trials, the test was cancelled and the subject excluded from the analysis. 
Only dogs who completed four trials were included in the dataset. 
 
To assess reliability, 20% of all trials (48 trials by children in total, from 3 children per condition; 56 trials 
featuring canine participants, from 2–3 participants per condition) were coded from tape by a second 
observer unaware of the experimental hypotheses and ignorant of the particular conditions. There was 
100% agreement between coders about which containers both children and dogs chose. 
For all participants, the sum of successful retrievals was calculated. 
 
Results 
In each of the conditions, participants' performance was compared to chance (correct choices, n = 2). 
Children retrieved the toy above chance in the ostensive/intentional condition (one sample t-test: mean 
retrieval = 2.88, t(15) = 2.782, p = .014; success in 72% of trials), and in the non-ostensive/intentional 
condition (mean = 2.87, t(14) = 3.166, p = .007; 72% success). In both accidental conditions children found 
the toy only at chance (ostensive accidental: mean = 2.21, t(13) = 0.822, p = .426; 55% success; non-
ostensive accidental: mean = 1.88,t(15) = −0.808, p = .432; 47% success). (See Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Mean success of child and canine participants at retrieving the hidden prize across conditions. 
Comparable conditions in children and dogs are marked with identical colour/pattern combinations. The 
dotted line indicates chance performance (n = 2/4 successful retrievals). Asterisks indicate performance 
above chance. 
 
Dogs retrieved the food above chance in both non-ostensive conditions (non-ostensive/intentional: one 
sample t-test: mean retrieval = 2.64, t(13) = 2.590, p = .022; 66% success; non-ostensive/accidental: mean = 
2.64, t(13) = 2.386, p = .033; 66% success), but at chance in both ostensive conditions 
(ostensive/intentional: mean = 1.93, t(13) = 0.291, p = .775; 48% success; ostensive accidental: mean = 
1.86,t(13) = 0.520, p = .612; 47% success). In addition, dogs also found the hidden food very significantly 
above chance in the ostensive pointing control condition (mean = 3.36, t(13) = 6.032, p < .001; 84% 
success). 
 
In addition to the comparisons to chance, we also ran a model combining all participants and testing for the 
effects of species, intentionality, ostension, sex, and the order in which trials were presented. Initially we 
used a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (Baayen, 2008) into which we included the order of presentation of 
trials (e.g. LRRL vs. RLLR) as a random effect. Since this variable appeared to have no significant effect of 
participants' performance (variance component = 0) we subsequently collapsed it across the data. We then 
ran a combined Generalized Linear Model (McCullagh & Nelder, 2008) to test for whether ostension, 
intention, and species affected the proportion of participants' correct responses. Coding as our response 
the number of successful and unsuccessful retrievals, we fitted our model with binomial error structure and 
logit link function. (Using R one can model an individual's successful vs. unsuccessful responses as a 
proportion, using a binomial model.) As variables in the model we included ostension, intention and 
species, and all interactions between them (including the three-way ostension*intention*species 
interaction). To control for the effect of sex we included it as an additional predictor, and to test for the 
overall effect of ostension, intention and species we used a likelihood ratio test (Dobson, 2002) to compare 
the full model with a null model comprising only sex as a predictor (Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011). We 
considered the effects of two-way interactions only if the three-way interaction was insignificant and so 
removed from the model; and we considered main effects only when they were not involved in significant 
two-way interactions (which were then themselves removed from the model). The removal of terms from 
the model was conditional on the comparison of the full model to the null one being significant. We did not 
compare nested models, dropping only the parameter of interest, since this strategy can generate false 
positive results (Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011). 
 
In order to better understand the results of the model with regard to the difference between humans and 
dogs, we also ran the corresponding models separately for each species. In both of these models, we 
included ostension and intentionality and their interaction as fixed effects in the initial full models. 
Furthermore, we included sex (fixed effect) and counterbalancing sequence (random effect) to control for 
their effects. Initially we ran GLMMs but when the counterbalancing sequence appeared insignificant we 
removed it and ran a GLM. The structure of the response and error link function was identical to the other 
models. 
 
In the combined species model, there was a significant difference between the null model, which included 
only sex as a predictor variable, and the full model which also included ostension, intention, species, and 
their interactions (likelihood ratio test comparing full and null model: c2 = 21.87, df = 7, p = .003). However, 
we found no significant three-way interaction (estimate±SE = −0.39 ± 0.77, z =  −0.51,p = .614), and also no 
two-way interaction between ostension and intention (−0.16 ± 0.39, z  =  −0.42, p = .672; assessed from the 
model in which the non-significant three-way interaction had been removed). The other two interactions 
were significant (species*ostension: 0.97 ± 0.39, z = 2.52, p = .012; species*intention: 
0.89 ± 0.39, z = 2.3, p = .022), indicating that the effects of ostension and intention contributed to the 
performance of humans and dogs in different ways. 
In the model comprising human participants alone, there was a significant difference between the full 
model and the null model, which included only sex as a predictor variable (likelihood ratio test: c2 = 
12.79, df = 3, p = .005). We found no interaction of intention*ostension (estimate+SE = 
−0.37 + 0.55, z  =  −0.67, p = .504). However, when this interaction was subsequently dropped from the 
model, we found a main effect of intention (0.92 + 0.27, z = 3.35, p = .001), although not of ostension 
(0.20 + 0.27, z = 0.73, p = .468). 
 
For dogs, a full model comprising ostension, intention, their interaction, and sex as predictors was also 
significantly better than a null model comprising sex alone (likelihood ratio test: c2 = 8.10, df = 3, p = .044). 
(Data from the pointing control condition were not included in this analysis.) We found no 
intention*ostension interaction (estimate+SE = 0.05 + 0.55, z = 0.08, p = .94). When this interaction was 
subsequently dropped from the model, we found a main effect of ostension 




To solve this task, participants had to take the experimenter's pulling the rope to be relevant to their hiding 
and finding game, and revelatory of her intention to indicate the location of the prize. Children determined 
this above chance in both intentional conditions, but neither accidental condition. The presence of 
ostensive cues, in the form of ostensive eye contact and directed speech, made no difference to their 
success. By contrast, dogs found the prize above chance only in non-ostensive conditions. Intentional 
performance made no difference to their success. 
 
These findings suggest that children were not searching for the toy because of the greater salience of the 
shaken bucket. Rather, in the intentional conditions, they took the experimenter's actions to be revelatory 
of communicative intent – or, at least, were willing to treat her behaviour as if it were revelatory of 
communicative intent. (The latter may have occurred in the intentional, non-ostensive condition – where 
the communicative nature of E1's action was less evident.) Consequently, in intentional conditions they 
searched in the location that the experimenter's action indicated. Children also assumed that unintentional 
actions are not communicative, such that the shaking of one box in the accidental conditions was not an 
expression of communicative intent. In these conditions they did not use the experimenter's actions as a 
guide, and located the toy only at chance. By contrast, dogs' failure to use intentional performance of the 
sign as a cue suggests that – at least in this experimental set-up – they were not tracking the 
experimenter's communicative intent, but only tracking the salience of one location relative to the other. 
Nonetheless, in the pointing control condition they did find the food above chance. Their performance in 
experimental conditions was therefore not explained by a general inability to track human communicative 
intent. 
 
Ostensive performance actually undermined dogs' success. This may be because, at least in this task, dogs 
were using a non-communicative strategy to locate the food – and searching on the basis of the salience of 
the hiding place relative to the other. In the ostensive conditions the experimenter's ostensive gaze 
preoccupied their attention, such that they failed to register the shaking of the hiding location. This finding 
is consistent with evidence that ostensive behaviour by a human can actually distract dogs when they are in 
a social learning situation – by diverting their attention from potentially rewarding sources of information 
(Range, Heucke, Gruber, Konz, Huber & Virányi, 2009). 
 
In contrast to dogs, ostensive performance played no significant role in children's recognition of 
communicative intent. This replicates a recent finding that the presence of ostensive cues is at least 
sometimes unnecessary for comprehending communicative intent, even where highly novel signs are used 
(Moore et al., 2013). It also extends this finding by identifying the ability to do without ostension in children 
of 27 months – 9 months younger than those previously tested. 
 
One function for ostensive cues that might be predicted by proponents of the sufficiency claim (e.g. 
Csibra, 2010) would be using the presence of ostension to infer that a novel sign was being used with 
communicative intent. Given the absence of an effect of ostension in children, it seems unlikely that they 
were using ostension in this way. Rather, they relied on other cues to infer the communicative nature of 
the sign. It may be that where communicative interaction has already been established, or where a context 
of ongoing interaction generates the expectation that communicative behaviour might be forthcoming, 
children are willing to treat acts as potentially communicative even in the absence of ostensive cues – so 
long as they are performed intentionally. Such contexts might explain the superfluity of ostensive cues in 
the present study, given the inclusion of a warm-up game in which the experimenter made evident her 
intention to help participants find the hidden toy. 
 
Our findings are not inconsistent with the claim that ostensive cues suffice to indicate communicative 
intent – both for children (Gergely & Csibra, 2005; Gergely et al., 2007; Csibra & Gergely, 2009; 
Csibra, 2010) and dogs (Téglás et al., 2012). It may be that children in ostensive conditions initially 
interpreted ostensive performances as communicative acts, and only subsequently reasoned that ostensive 
but accidental acts could not be communicative, or that non-ostensive acts might nonetheless be 
communicative. In ostensive conditions, dogs might also have expected a communicative act, but simply 
failed to recognize the experimenter's rope-pulling as a sign. Perhaps they were waiting for a point that 
never came. Nonetheless, our findings do not support the claim that ostensive cues suffice to indicate 
communicative intent, since they are consistent with weaker claims – for example, that ostensive cues 
function only to solicit attention (Moore et al., 2013; Moore, 2014). Moreover, the findings show that 
children are less dependent on ostensive cues for interpreting communication than might be supposed. 
 
There may be several possible explanations for why dogs but not children found this study difficult. 
 
One possibility is that canine subjects failed to understand the equipment used. Some evidence suggests 
that while dogs do understand the basics of pulling on a string to obtain a reward that is attached to the 
string (the ‘connectivity principle'), when strings are arranged such that the end of an un-baited string is 
nearer to the reward than the end of the baited string, dogs choose the nearer, un-baited string (Osthaus, 
Lea & Slater, 2005; Range, Möslinger & Virányi, 2012; Riemer, Müller, Range & Huber, 2014). Given their 
rudimentary understanding of connectivity, it may be that dogs in this study simply failed to understand 
that the experimenter's behaviour caused the shaking of the bucket. While this is possible, we do not think 
it likely. First, all of the above studies support the conclusion that dogs do understand connectivity in 
simple causal cognition tasks, as do further studies (Mersmann, Tomasello, Call, Kaminski & Taborsky, 2011; 
Range, Hentrup & Virányi, 2011). Connectivity and proximity were not confounded in our apparatus – 
making our task simpler than those in which dogs perform poorly. In addition, dogs did perform above 
chance in three out of five conditions, including the intentional pointing control – suggesting that they did 
take the shaking of one bucket to be relevant to the task of finding the food. Nonetheless, we acknowledge 
that we cannot conclusively rule out this possibility. (In future research dogs' ability to infer communicative 
intent from an act of rope pulling could be confirmed or disconfirmed using a simpler mechanism, less 
dependent on their understanding of connectivity.) In the meantime, in what follows we focus primarily on 
the implications of children's positive performance for their understanding of communicative intent. 
 
An alternative explanation of the data is that what drives recognition of communicative intent is not 
ostension, but the knowledge that a particular type of action could be used as a sign; and that children but 
not dogs were able to grasp that a rope can be pulled with communicative intent (that is, that a rope-pull 
can be used as a sign). Since children grasped this potential, they tracked intentional performance of the 
sign and inferred that the experimenter was performing the action in order to indicate the toy's location. By 
contrast, dogs may simply have failed to grasp that the experimenter was acting with communicative 
intent, and so tracked food using a non-communicative strategy. Children's success in this task shows that 
they possess a flexible understanding of the range of actions that can be performed with communicative 
intent – perhaps even knowing that any action could, in principle, be performed communicatively. Dogs 
may not share this insight – perhaps recognizing only a range of points, vocalizations and iconic signs and 
markers as potentially communicative acts (at least, so long as the icons and markers are held by a human). 
What would be the adaptive value of recognizing actions as potentially communicative, even in the absence 
of ostension and ‘embodied' referential cues like gaze and extended limbs? One possibility is that this 
reflects an adaptive ability for communication with absent others. 
 
Using gaze and limbs to direct others in space, and eye contact to address communicative acts to an 
intended audience, is an excellent way to coordinate with others who remain in visual contact. Extended 
limbs and orientation also make for a repertoire of signs that is easily understood as referential because 
they naturally express an agent's interest in or preoccupation with the feature of the world towards which 
she is looking or pointing (Bar-On, 2013; Moore, 2013). This makes such signs particularly easy to interpret. 
They are therefore likely to have been particularly important for our ancestors in coordinating their 
movements with others in the context of cooperative activity (Tomasello, 2008), such as hunting and 
herding interactions. 
 
Some of these interactions are likely to have included dogs in the process of being domesticated, leading to 
selective pressure for them to understand at least a limited repertoire of signs that would enable their 
human masters to coordinate their movements over medium distances, and in the present moment. In 
these interactions, our ancestors could have used their limbs, bodies and gaze, not to mention voice 
projection, to direct the dog's movements (Wobber & Kaminski, 2011; Kaminski & Nitzschner, 2013; 
Rossano, Nitzschner & Tomasello, 2014). This is consistent with existing evidence that dogs interpret the 
movements of a variety of extended human – but not artificial – limbs as expressive of communicative 
intent. (Crucially, when dogs understand iconic signs and markers, they were held up and shown to dogs by 
humans; they were not understood in the absence of their owners (Udell et al., 2008; Riedel et al., 2006; 
Wobber et al., 2009; Kaminski et al., 2009b).) It is also consistent with the finding that where familiar signs 
are used, whether or not they are performed purposively makes a difference to whether dogs treat them as 
communicative (Kaminski et al., 2012). 
 
Such ‘embodied' signs and vocalizations would be much less effective when interlocutors were not (in some 
sense) co-present. As they engaged in spatio-temporally extended cooperative activities, our ancestors 
came under pressure to plan and communicate about activities that were both physically and temporally 
distant. These pressures likely resulted in selection for abilities that reduced dependence on directed gaze 
and the extension of limbs – such that even early in ontogeny children can see ‘disembodied' signs as 
revelatory of a speaker's message. 
 
In their earliest iterations, these signs might have been marks left by group members to carry messages for 
others lagging behind. In such cases, ostensive cues could not be usefully employed, and varieties of 
‘disembodied' sign would also be needed to show others where to go. Here markers of intentional 
production are likely to have been key to the possibility of a sign's being appropriately interpreted – as a 
means, for example, of disambiguating a deliberately carved arrow from mere scratches on a tree, and so 
marking that arrow as a potential bearer of a speaker's message. Humans might therefore have developed 
skills for identifying communicative intent across a range of contexts – skills for which dogs had no need. 
This is not to downplay dogs' exceptional skills for understanding human communication. They have been 
shown to be capable of some highly impressive inferences about what others could be referring to, when 
these intentions are articulated vocally (Kaminski, Call & Fischer, 2004; Kaminski, Bräuer, Call & 
Tomasello, 2009a; Kaminski et al., 2009b) and through familiar gestures like points (Scheider et al.,2011). 
Nonetheless, the variety of actions that dogs recognize as potential signs may be limited even in 
comparison to 2-year-old children. 
 
Future studies should seek to confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis – not least, perhaps, by trying to 
replicate the current study using a system of signs less dependent on dogs' understanding of connectivity. 
 
Acknowledegments 
The authors would like to thank Katja Schönefeld, Kerstin Esau and Christian Biermann, who tested the 
children in this study, and the research assistant Susanne Mauritz. In addition, Roger Mundry provided 
invaluable statistical advice, Marike Schreiber made the illustrations in Figure 1, and Gloria Wallmeier 
carried out reliability coding. Thom Scott-Phillips, Anna Strasser, and two anonymous reviewers provided 




Baayen, R. (2008). Analyzing linguistic data. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bar-On, D. (2013). Origins of communication: must we ‘go Gricean'? Mind & Language, 28 (3), 342–375. 
Behne, T., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2005). One-year-olds comprehend the communicative 
intentions behind gestures in a hiding game. Developmental Science, 8 (6), 492–499. 
Behne, T., Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Twelve-month-olds' comprehension and 
production of pointing. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30, 359–375. 
Bräuer, J., Kaminski, J., Riedel, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Making inferences about the location of 
hidden food: Social dog, causal ape. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 120 (1), 38–47. 
Coppinger, R., & Coppinger, L. (2001). Dogs: A startling new understanding of canine origin, behavior and 
evolution. New York: Scribner. 
Csibra, G. (2010). Recognizing communicative intentions in infancy. Mind & Language, 25 (2), 141–168. 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2009). Natural pedagogy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13 (4), 148–153. 
Dobson, A. (2002). An introduction to generalized linear models. Boca Raton, FL: Chapman and Hall/CRC 
Press. 
Forstmeier, W., & Schielzeth, H. (2011). Cryptic multiple hypotheses testing in linear models: overestimated 
effect sizes and the winner's curse. Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology, 65, 47–55. 
Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2005). The social construction of the cultural mind: imitative learning as a 
mechanism of human pedagogy. Interaction Studies, 6 (3), 463–481. 
Gergely, G., Egyed, K., & Király, I. (2007). On pedagogy. Developmental Science, 10 (1), 139–146. 
Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. London: Harvard University Press. 
Hare, B., Brown, M., Williamson, C., & Tomasello, M. (2002). The domestication of social cognition in dogs. 
Science, 298, 1634–1636. 
Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (1999). Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use human and conspecific social cues to 
locate hidden food. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 113 (2), 173–177. 
Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Human-like social skills in dogs? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 439–444. 
Kaminski, J., Bräuer, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2009a). Domestic dogs are sensitive to a human's 
perspective. Behaviour, 146 (7), 979–998. 
Kaminski, J., Call, J., & Fischer, J. (2004). Word learning in a domestic dog: evidence for ‘fast mapping'. 
Science, 304 (5677), 1682–1683. 
Kaminski, J., & Nitzschner, M. (2013). Do dogs get the point? A review of dog–human communication 
ability. Learning and Motivation, 44 (4), 294–302. 
Kaminski, J., Nitzschner, M., Wobber, V., Tennie, C., Bräuer, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Do dogs 
distinguish rational from irrational acts? Animal Behaviour, 81 (1), 195–203. 
Kaminski, J., Schulz, L., & Tomasello, M. (2012). How dogs know when communication is intended for them. 
Developmental Science, 15 (2), 222–232. 
Kaminski, J., Tempelmann, S., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2009b). Domestic dogs comprehend human 
communication with iconic signs. Developmental Science, 12 (6), 831–837. 
Kirchhofer, K., Zimmermann, F., Kaminski, J., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Dogs (Canis familiaris), but not 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) understand imperative pointing. PLoS ONE, 7 (2), e30913. 
Lakatos, G., Soproni, K., Dóka, A., & Miklósi, Á. (2009). A comparative approach to dogs' (Canis familiaris) 
and human infants' comprehension of various forms of pointing gestures. Animal Cognition, 12, 621–631. 
Leekam, S.R., Solomon, T.L., & Teoh, Y.-S. (2010). Adults' social cues facilitate young children's use of signs 
and symbols. Developmental Science, 13 (1), 108–119. 
McCullagh, P., & Nelder, J.A. (2008). Generalized linear models. London: Chapman and Hall. 
Mersmann, D., Tomasello, M., Call, J., Kaminski, J., & Taborsky, M. (2011). Simple mechanisms can explain 
social learning in domestic dogs (Canis familiaris). Ethology, 117, 1–16. 
Miklósi, Á., Polgárdi, R., Topál, J., & Csányi, V. (1998). Use of experimenter-given cues in dogs. Animal 
Cognition, 1, 113–121. 
Moore, R. (2013). Evidence and interpretation in great ape gestural communication. Humana. Mente, 
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 24, 27–51. 
Moore, R. (2014). Ontogenetic constraints on Grice's theory of communication. In D. Matthews (Ed.), 
Pragmatic development in first language acqusition (pp. 87–104). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Moore, R., Liebal, K., & Tomasello, M. (2013). Three-year-olds understand communicative intentions 
without language, gestures, or gaze. Interaction Studies, 14 (1), 62–80. 
Osthaus, B., Lea, S.E., & Slater, A.M. (2005). Dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) fail to show understanding of 
means–end connections in a string-pulling task. Animal Cognition, 8 (1), 37–47. 
Range, F., Hentrup, M., & Virányi, Z. (2011). Dogs are able to solve a means–end task. Animal Cognition, 14, 
575–583. 
Range, F., Heucke, S., Gruber, C., Konz, A., Huber, L., & Virányi, Z. (2009). The effect of ostensive cues on 
dogs' performance in a manipulative social learning task. Applied Animal Behaviour Sciences, 120 (3), 170–
178. 
Range, F., Möslinger, H., & Virányi, Z. (2012). Domestication has not affected the understanding of means–
end connections in dogs. Animal Cognition, 15, 597–607. 
Riedel, J., Buttelmann, D., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use a physical 
marker to locate hidden food. Animal Cognition, 9, 27–35. 
Riemer, S., Müller, C., Range, F., & Huber, L. (2014). Dogs (Canis familiaris) can learn to attend to 
connectivity in string pulling tasks. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 128 (1), 31–39. 
Rossano, F., Nitzschner, M., & Tomasello, M. (2014). Domestic dogs and puppies can use human voice 
direction referentially. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London – Series B. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.3201 
Scheider, L., Grassmann, S., Kaminski, J., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Domestic dogs use contextual information 
and tone of voice when following a human pointing gesture. PLoS ONE, 6 (7), e21676. 
Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2008). Gaze following in human infants depends on communicative signals. Current 
Biology, 18, 668–671. 
Soproni, K., Miklósi, Á., Topál, J., & Csányi, V. (2001). Comprehension of human communicative signs in pet 
dogs (Canis familiaris). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 115 (1), 122–126. 
Téglás, E., Gergely, A., Kupán, K., Miklósi, Á., & Topál, J. (2012). Dogs' gaze following is tuned to human 
communicative signals. Current Biology, 22 (3), 209–212. 
Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. London: Harvard University Press. 
Tomasello, M. (2008). Origins of human communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Gluckman, A. (1997). Comprehension of novel communicative signs by apes and 
human children. Child Development, 68 (6), 1067–1080. 
Topál, J., Gergely, G., Erdőhegyi, Á., Csibra, G., & Miklósi, Á. (2009). Differential sensitivity to human 
communication in dogs, wolves, and human infants. Science, 325, 1269–1272. 
Udell, M., Giglio, R., & Wynne, C. (2008). Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use human gestures but not 
nonhuman tokens to find hidden food. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 122 (1), 84–93. 
Wobber, V., Hare, B., Koler-Matznick, J., Wrangham, R., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Evidence for two waves of 
selection on the social skills of dogs. Interaction Studies, 10 (2), 206–224. 
Wobber, V., & Kaminski, J. (2011). What do dogs understand about human communicative signals? A novel 
synthesis. In V. DeGiovine (Ed.), Dogs: Biology, behavior, and health disorders (pp. 93–109). New York: Nova 
Science Publishers. 
